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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mrs. Malette was wheeled into the emergency room only half-
conscious from the car wreck that widowed her.1 The attending nurse 
searched her purse and found a card stating the she was a Jehovah’s Witness 
(JW) and that she refused blood products in all circumstances, including the 
blood transfusion her physician believed was necessary to save her life.2 
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 1.  Malette v. Shulman, [1987] 63 O.R. 2d 243, 246 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 2.  Id. at 246–47, 248. Her daughter also confirmed that Mrs. Malette was a practicing JW and 
would refuse the transfusion if she could speak. Id. at 268; see What Does the Bible Say About Blood 
Transfusions?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES (last visited Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.jw.org/en/bible-
teachings/questions/bible-about-blood-transfusion/ [https://perma.cc/9828-RGGB]; Why Don’t 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES (last visited Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y9FU-TS4U]. 
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Despite understanding Mrs. Malette’s wishes,3 the physician transfused her 
himself.4 He was guilty of battery.5 Any common law court would agree that 
“[a] conscious, rational patient is entitled to refuse any medical treatment 
and the doctor must comply, no matter how ill-advised he may believe that 
instruction to be.”6 Here, the best thing for the patient is to respect her 
autonomy. But, what is best when the person refusing is a child?7 
A.C., a 14-year-old Canadian girl, was ordered to submit to something 
that she believed would doom her soul to oblivion, along with every other 
non-JW, while her parents, the faithful, ascended to heaven.8 Was that order 
and subsequent procedure in her best interest? Although the Canadian 
Supreme Court refined and applied the common law best-interest test in 
considering her case, it failed to consider her damnation as a possibility. In 
fact, the Court only concerned itself with A.C.’s interest in her physical 
health and her autonomy. This was a mistake. Even though the record did 
not show whether A.C. actually believed her soul would be destroyed, it was 
possible that she did. 
As in this case, courts applying the best-interest test generally fail to 
consider the claims minors make about their souls. Yet, theists have almost 
 
 3.  Malette, 63 O.R. at 247. 
 4.  Id. at 248. 
 5.  Id. at 273. 
 6.  Id. at 269, 273 (The card represented her considered restriction on treatment.); e.g., Cruzan v. 
Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment . . . .”); A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009 SCC 
30, [2009] S.C.R. 181, para. 39 (Can.); Heart of Eng. NHS Found. Tr. v. JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP), 
2014 WL 640403 (Eng.) (“[A]nyone capable of making decisions has an absolute right to accept or refuse 
medical treatment, regardless of the wisdom or consequences of the decision. The decision does not have 
to be justified to anyone.”). 
 7.  For a fictional presentation of this issue, consider the novel, The Children Act or the science 
fiction television episode, Believers. IAN MCEWAN, THE CHILDREN ACT (2014) (set in modern London 
from the perspective of a High Court Judge who must perform the best-interest test described below for 
a 17-year-old JW boy); Babylon 5: Believers (Warner Brothers Apr. 27, 1994) (An alien child on an 
Earth-captained space station will die without surgery, but he and his race believe that surgery will release 
his spirit from his body and permit a demon to maintain the body’s life and awareness.). 
 8.  It is not clear the extent to which third-party actors can cause spiritual damage to Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, but this is a plausible interpretation of the Watchtower’s publications. See What Is Hell? Is It 
a Place of Eternal Torment?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES (last visited Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.jw.org/en/bible-teachings/questions/what-is-hell/ [https://perma.cc/8536-737Y] (regarding 
the nature of hell); What Hope Is There for the Dead?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES (last visited Nov. 24, 
2017), https://www.jw.org/en/publications/books/good-news-from-god/what-hope-for-the-dead/ 
[https://perma.cc/7NJM-REN7] (giving an overview of the dead); Who Go to Heaven?, JEHOVAH’S 
WITNESSES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.jw.org/en/bible-teachings/questions/go-to-heaven/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TPP-6H5A] (regarding who goes to heaven and the goodness of an earthly 
resurrection). Further, based on the assessment of the psychiatrists on record, A.C. worried that 
submitting to the transfusion would jeopardize her relationship with God. A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 
6. 
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universally believed that the state of the soul is far more important than the 
state of the body. Insofar as a court is truly concerned with the minor’s best 
interest, her soul must enter the balance. 
A.C. v. Manitoba, thus, lies at the nexus of four major legal doctrines: 
1) the right to refuse medical treatment (Mrs. Malette’s example); 2) the 
rights of parents to bring up their children as they see fit; 3) the best interest 
of children; and 4) the right of an individual (child or adult) to practice a 
religion. 
The United Kingdom’s case, Gillick v. West Norfolk, established the 
“best-interest” test, which A.C. v. Manitoba applied. Using the analysis in 
Gillick, Part II will show that parental rights are derivative of the minor’s 
rights. Part III will first track the use and development of the best-interest 
test through the U.K., Australia, the United Nations’ Convention on the 
Rights of Children, and the United States. It will then consider how the 
Canadian Supreme Court applied it in A.C. v. Manitoba and show how 
dismissive the Court was of A.C.’s underlying religious claims. Part IV will 
argue that Canada and the United States are agnostic states and not atheistic 
and that this fact affects how they should regard the religious claims of their 
citizens. Part V explores the response agnostic States ought to have to three 
different types of religious claims by minors. 
II. PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Parents generally have broad rights to govern the conduct of their 
children and what is done to them.9 In a medical context, they can usually 
refuse treatment for their child and they might do so for three general 
reasons. First, they might refuse because they disagree with the doctor that 
the risks of physical harm of the treatments outweigh the expected physical 
benefits (“physical rationale”). Second, they might refuse because they 
believe there is something unethical about the treatment without reference to 
God or a religion, for example, treatments derived from animal testing 
(“ethical rationale”). Third, they might refuse based on God’s command or 
a religion (“religious rationale”). 
Each of these three rationales can reference the interests of either the 
child or the parents, other-centered and selfish motivations respectively. 
“Selfish” in this case, does not mean morally repugnant10 nor does “other-
 
 9.  See, e.g., Gillick v. West Norfolk [1985] UKHL 7, [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL) 184, 188 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (Scarman J.). 
 10.  English does not seem to have a word that describes doing things for oneself that is not infected 
with negative charge. 
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centered” mean morally laudable. They only denote the orientation or basis 
of the action.11 
While the parents may believe that the treatment might be too painful 
for the child, they may also be influenced or even decide based on how 
difficult it will be for them to see what their child must go through. 
With respect to the ethical and religious rationales, parents’ selfish 
motivations can be especially powerful and might also be laudable. In these 
two cases, though, “selfish” does not mean “for one’s own benefit” but rather 
“in keeping with one’s own sense of right and wrong.” The parents certainly 
act in accord with their ethical or religious principles to maintain their own 
sense of integrity, but they also do so because they believe the principles to 
be right and applicable to all, even to their child. Thus, if the parents believe 
that these treatments are objectively unethical or irreligious, then in keeping 
with their beliefs, they should selfishly oppose their use in every case. 
Animal-rights parents, too, should selfishly oppose the use of treatments 
developed by harming animals. JW parents should selfishly refuse a blood 
transfusion for their child. Perhaps they are wrong; perhaps their consciences 
are ill-formed. Nevertheless, they should do as their consciences dictate. 
Yet, the parents’ consciences only inform us obliquely about the child’s 
interests. The touchstone of surrogate decision-making is not the interest of 
the parents, nor the animals, nor even God himself, but the interest of the 
patient. The seminal case, Gillick v. West Norfolk, addressed this issue, and 
heavily influenced A.C. v. Manitoba. In Gillick, the United Kingdom’s 
House of Lords12 explained that, under common law, parental rights are not 
absolute.13 
Rather, parental rights are “derived from parental duty and exist only 
so long as they are needed for the protection of the person and property of 
the child.”14 These rights consist of “custody, care, and control of the person 
and guardianship of the property of the child.”15 Further, parental rights 
 
 11.  For example, one may eat merely to sustain oneself, which would be selfish and morally neutral 
(or even laudable). In contrast, one could eat in order to survive long enough to exact revenge, which 
would be other-centered and morally repugnant. 
 12.  Five Lords decide cases and each write independent opinions. Lords Fraser and Scarman wrote 
the most extensive and subsequently persuasive opinions for the majority holding, so their opinions are 
most cited here. 
 13.  Lord Fraser frames Mrs. Gillick’s argument as proposing “an absolute right to be informed of 
and to veto such advice or treatment [on contraception] being given to her daughters even in the ‘most 
unusual’ cases” and goes on to reject it. Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 170 (Fraser).This case is discussed more 
fully below. See infra Section III. A.  
 14.  Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 184 (Scarman); see Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 170 (Fraser) (Parental rights 
“exist for the benefit of the child and they are justified only in so far as they enable the parent to perform 
his duties towards the child . . . .”). 
 15.  Id. at 184 (Scarman). 
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against the claims of third-parties, including against the claims of the State, 
“exist[] primarily to enable the parent to discharge his duty of maintenance, 
protection, and education until [the child] reaches such an age as to be able 
to look after himself and make his own decisions.”16 The entire rationale for 
parental rights is thus derivative of the prior rights of the minor and a minor’s 
ability to think and make decisions does not spontaneously attach to her 
precisely 18 years after her birth. The law should recognize this and give 
minors expanding rights to make decisions about their own bodies as they 
mature.17 In practice, many parents offer children increasing autonomy as 
the parents recognize increasing intelligence and understanding in their 
child.18 The legal right of a parent over a child is “a dwindling right which 
the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, and the 
more so the older he is. It starts with a right of control and ends with little 
more than advice.”19 
Without an absolute right of parents, there may be some circumstances 
in which a doctor (and the State as enforcer) will be in a better position to 
decide what medical advice and treatment conduce to a child’s welfare than 
the parents (and the child).20 Thus, in the view of one of the Gillick-majority, 
“[t]he only practicable course is to entrust the doctor with a discretion to act 
in accordance with his view of what is best in the interests of the [child] who 
is his patient.”21 
Gillick created a test for a doctor to perform before giving medical 
advice without parental consent or knowledge. Generalizing the test to apply 
to other medical situations, before treating a minor patient the doctor must 
 
 16.  Id.  at 185 (Scarman); see id. at 184–85 (analyzing Blackstone’s Commentaries in relevant part). 
 17.  Id. at 171 (Fraser). 
 18.  Id. at 171 (Fraser); see id. at 186 (Scarman) (“[P]arental right[s] yield[] to the child’s right to 
make his own decisions when he reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of 
making up his own mind on the matter requiring decision.”). 
 19.  Id. at 172 (Fraser); Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 186 (Scarman) (quoting the same).  
 20.  Id. at 173 (Fraser). 
 21.  Id. at 174 (Fraser). Courts in the United States are not so convinced that this conclusion follows 
as quickly as Lord Fraser thinks it does, but at some point, even American courts intervene when they 
find that the parents are incorrectly evaluating the interests of the child in a particularly egregious way 
(i.e., child abuse or neglect) and then take temporary (or permanent) custody. See Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General Medical 
Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 789 (Apr. 2013) (explaining that the U.S. refuses to join the Convention 
of the Rights of the Child discussed below because of the country’s emphasis on parental rights over the 
child); see, e.g., Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“The statist notion that governmental power 
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is 
repugnant to American tradition.”); R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C., 572 So.2d 1225, 1227–28 (Ala. 1990) 
(“The will of the parents is controlling, except in those extreme instances where the state takes over to 
rescue the child from parental neglect or to save its life. Similarly, the right to grant or refuse a medical 
examination of a child belongs not to the child, but to the parents.”). 
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be satisfied 1) that the patient will understand her advice, 2) that she cannot 
persuade the patient to inform the patient’s parents or to allow her to inform 
the patient’s parents, 3) that without her advice and treatment, the patient’s 
physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer, and 4) that the patient’s 
best interests require her to give advice, treatment, or both without parental 
consent.22 
This fourth step is what most influences subsequent child-medical-
refusal jurisprudence. At the outset, the test presupposes that the person with 
training in securing physical health will be most adept at securing the minor’s 
best interest. And yet, what makes a doctor a superior decision-maker with 
respect to the minor’s ethical or religious interests, or even her autonomy 
interests? Parents are the default surrogate decision-makers, but once a 
physician or State official challenges the parents’ decision, a court must 
intervene to decide what is in the minor’s best interest. 
III. THE BEST-INTEREST TEST 
A. Common Law and Other Sources 
The common-law best-interest test is supposed to ensure that the best 
interest of the minor is secured. In application, it becomes a balancing test 
that protects two interests of the minor: first, physical integrity and second, 
autonomy. Autonomy is protected by testing the minor’s capacity to make a 
decision in a given circumstance. As the minor’s interest in autonomy grows, 
the State’s interest in ensuring her physical integrity decreases. It was not 
until A.C. v. Manitoba that the test was described this way and even there, 
not in such a succinct manner. Nevertheless, thinking about the test in this 
way helps provide order that the various courts lacked while developing the 
doctrine.23 
As introduced above, the modern iteration of the best-interest test began 
in Gillick v. West Norfolk. Mrs. Gillick sued England’s Department of Health 
and Social Security (DHSS) to ensure her female children would not be 
advised on the use of contraception under a new statutory and regulatory 
scheme.24 The National Health Services Act of 1977 had directed the 
Secretary of State “to arrange . . . for the giving of advice on contraception . 
 
 22.  Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 174 (Fraser). 
 23.  A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 53 (Can.) (“[T]he issues of 
autonomy and “best interests” were conflated to some degree: the question was whether the minor was 
capable of ‘exercis[ing] a wise choice in his or her own interests.’” (quoting Gillick v. West Norfolk [1985] 
UKHL 7, [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL) 188 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Scarman))). 
 24.  See Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 119–20 (Parker). 
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. . .”25 Pursuant to that duty, the Secretary worked with the DHSS to issue a 
Memorandum of Guidance to interpret for doctors their duties with respect 
to contraceptives.26 After emphasizing that parental responsibility and 
privilege is important, and that in all ordinary cases parents should be 
consulted before giving medical advice to children under 16,27 the 
memorandum said that in “exceptional cases”28—such as when parents are 
“unconcerned, entirely unresponsive, or grossly disturbed”—“the nature of 
any counselling must be a matter for the doctor or other professional worker 
concerned and that the decision whether or not to prescribe contraception 
must be for the clinical judgment of a doctor.”29 Thus, doctors could—in 
exceptional cases—counsel on and prescribe contraceptives to minors 
without parental consent or even knowledge. 
After reaching the House of Lords, three of the five Lords held that the 
guidance was a valid interpretation of the statute and that minors could make 
autonomous medical decisions in certain situations.30 Lords Fraser and 
Scarman wrote extensive, independent opinions proposing slightly different 
justifications for these two propositions, and both are often cited for their 
justifications of the test.31 
The best-interest test in Gillick is a single sentence that is supposed to 
encapsulate what should be done in every circumstance involving a child: 
the child gains the “right to make his own decisions when he reaches a 
sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of making up his own 
mind on the matter requiring decision,”32 or, in another formulation, “to 
enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed.”33 Otherwise, the law 
would “impose upon the process of ‘growing up’ fixed limits where nature 
 
 25.  At section 5(1)(b) as quoted in Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 118 (Parker). 
 26.  Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 118 (Parker). 
 27.  A child in the United Kingdom may make autonomous medical decisions beginning at age 16. 
Family Law Reform Act 1969, c. 46, § 8(1) (Eng.) (“The consent of a minor who has attained the age of 
16 years to any surgical, medical or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute 
a trespass to his person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age . . . .”). 
 28.  Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 119 (Parker) (also stating that failing to obtain parental consent would 
be “most unusual”). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See id. at 195 (Bridge) (Lord Bridge “fully agree[s] with the reasons expressed by both” Lords 
Fraser and Scarman for rejecting Mrs. Gillick’s proposition). 
 31.  See, e.g., A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 51 (Can.). 
 32.  Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 186 (Scarman). 
 33.  Id. at 189; see also, id. at 169 (Fraser) (Especially since minors can enter some contracts, sue 
and be sued, give evidence in court, and consent to sexual intercourse, so long as the patient can 
understand what is proposed and can express his or her wishes, he or she can validly and effectively give 
consent to medical treatment.). 
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knows only a continuous process.” 34 Especially in an area so sensitive as 
personal choice about one’s own body, the State must be particularly careful. 
Because this test is so pliable, it can lead to different findings for the 
same minor with respect to different treatments. For example, the minor may 
be able to decide whether she wants the physician to set her bone now (before 
her parents can arrive),35 but unable to decide whether she should have 
surgery today or wait one more day. In this case, Mrs. Gillick’s female 
children could consent to receiving advice on and a prescription for 
contraception,36 but might not be able to refuse life-sustaining treatment over 
Mrs. Gillick’s opposition. 
In a case considering whether parents could sterilize a mentally retarded 
child, Australia’s High Court adopted Gillick as if it were its own case.37 The 
child’s best interest marks the limit of parental rights,38 which “diminish[] 
gradually as the child’s capacities and maturity grow and . . . this rate of 
development depends on the individual child.”39 The Court then reframed 
Gillick’s test for autonomy as a matter of informed consent, saying a “minor 
is . . . capable of giving informed consent when he or she ‘achieves a 
sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand 
fully what is proposed.’”40 
Likewise, the United Nations adopted the common law’s best-interest 
language in the Convention on the Rights of Children,41 to which Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and 137 other countries are signatories.42 
Echoing Gillick, the Convention requires that “[i]n all actions concerning 
 
 34.  Id. at 186 (Scarman). 
 35.  Id. at 169 (Fraser) (“It seems to me verging on the absurd to suggest that a girl or a boy aged 
15 could not effectively consent, for example, to have a medical examination of some trivial injury to his 
body or even to have a broken arm set.”). 
 36.  Id. at 169–70. 
 37.  Sec’y, Dept. of Health & Cmty. Servs. v J.W.B. (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 238 
(Austl.); id. at 229 (using the phrase “mental retardation”). Because this case considered the capacity of 
an intellectually disabled child, the Court extended the test to such children’s special circumstances: “[t]he 
age at which intellectually disabled children can consent will be higher than for children within the normal 
range of abilities.” Id. at 238. Consistent with the overall principal put forward in Gillick, intellectually 
disabled children must be evaluated individually because frequently such a child or adult is, in fact, 
capable of giving consent. Id. (“Any rule which purports to apply to the group of intellectually disabled 
children [as an undifferentiated whole] therefore involves sweeping generalization.”).  
 38.  Id. at 240. 
 39.  Id. at 237. 
 40.  Id. at 237 (quoting Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 189 (Scarman)).  
 41.  Art. 3(1), Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter, Convention]. 
 42.  Convention on the Rights of Children, MTDSG Ch. IV, Sect. 11 (The Clinton administration 
signed the Convention for the United States, but the Senate did not ratify it, so the U.S. is not bound by 
it. Canada ratified it Dec. 13, 1991.) available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf. 
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children . . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”43 
Further, signatories “shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of 
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of 
the rights recognized in the present Convention.”44 
In the U.S., medical care and family law are traditionally state law 
matters and surprisingly few states have adopted mature-minor exceptions. 
As of 2012, 34 states had no exception allowing a child under 18 to make 
medical decisions and only 8 of the remaining 26 had a broad mature-minor 
exception.45 Many of them consider the issue more in terms of the doctrine 
of informed consent, which is similar to best-interest, but distinct.46 The 
Supreme Court has referenced the best-interest test in the context of medical 
treatment only once, but rather than prescribing it for lower courts to apply, 
it used the phrase only to describe what parents already do with respect to 
their children.47 
Thus, before A.C. v. Manitoba, the test is a flip switch that “does no 
more than identify the person whose interests are in question: it does not 
assist in identifying the factors which are relevant to the best interests of the 
child.”48 The test values the minor’s intelligence level and capacity for 
understanding the treatment proposed, but it “offers no hierarchy of values . 
. . [and] in the absence of legal rules or a hierarchy of values, the best interests 
approach depends upon the value system of the decision-maker.”49 
B. A.C. v. Manitoba 
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted and further refined the best-
interest test in A.C. v. Manitoba, and tried to address these critiques, but in 
so doing, only made apparent the test’s weakness. 
 
 43.  Convention, art. 3(1); see also id., art. 9 (designating the best-interest test as the test for when 
it is appropriate to separate a child from her parents against their will).  
 44.  Convention, art. 5 (emphasis added); see also id., art. 14(2) (copying the text emphasized in art. 
5). 
 45.  Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 21, at 787, 790–91 (relating the author’s 50-state survey). The 
remaining states fell somewhere in-between.  
 46.  Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 21, at 790–91 Table 1. 
 47.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 604 (1979) (“[N]atural bonds of affection lead parents to 
act in the best interests of their children . . . The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or complain 
about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the parents’ authority to decide 
what is best for the child.”); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 236 (1972) (dismissing the 
State’s appeal to the child’s best interest while holding that Amish parents can withdraw their child from 
school younger than the State’s minimum).  
 48.  Marion’s Case, 175 CLR at 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 270–71. 
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A.C. was a 14-year-old girl in Manitoba, Canada with Crohn’s disease 
and as a Jehovah’s Witness, she “treasure[d] her relationship with God.”50 
To fulfill the dictates of her faith, she signed an advanced directive ordering 
that she not be given a blood transfusion “under any circumstances.”51 Her 
parents agreed fully with her decision.52 A few months later when her 
physician recommended she have a transfusion lest she die, she refused 
again.53 The Director of Child and Family Services took custody of her “as 
a child in need of protection” by the authority of the Child and Family 
Services Act (CFSA) and sought a court order authorizing the transfusion.54 
The motions judge concluded that the Act authorized him to order the 
treatment on his own view of A.C.’s best interests, no matter the child’s 
capacity to decide for herself, and so ordered the transfusion.55 A.C. received 
three units of blood and recovered.56 
A.C. appealed, arguing that the judge misinterpreted the CFSA and 
alternatively, that the CFSA was unconstitutional under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) because it infringed her right to 
freedom of religion.57 The appeals court affirmed that the motions judge had 
statutory authority to decide as he did, and that for a child under 16, capacity 
to decide was irrelevant.58 Further, section 1 of the Charter justified any 
infringement of A.C.’s freedom of religion under the Supreme Court’s 
Oakes-test.59 The Canadian Supreme Court agreed with the appeals court on 
each of its holdings, except it found that rather than supplanting the common 
law best-interest test, the CFSA incorporated it.60 
 
 50.  A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009 SCC 30, [2009] S.C.R. 181, para. 5–6 (Can.). 
 51.  Id. at para. 6; Why Don’t Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?, JEHOVAH’S 
WITNESSES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-
no-blood-transfusions/ [https://perma.cc/Y9FU-TS4U]. 
 52.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 6. 
 53.  Id. at para. 7. 
 54.  Id. at para. 8–9; Child & Family Services Act, C.C.S.M. C80 § 25(8) (Man.) (“[T]he court may 
authorize . . . any medical . . . treatment that the court considers to be in the best interests of the child.”) 
[hereinafter CFSA]. 
 55.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 12; CFSA § 25(8). 
 56.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 13. 
 57.  Id. at para. 14 (The court also considered whether the Act unjustly deprived her of her right to 
liberty (Charter § 7) or discriminated against her on the basis of religion (Charter § 15).); Canadian 
Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, § 2(a) being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience 
and religion . . . .”) [hereinafter, Charter]. 
 58.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 15. 
 59.  Id. at para. 18; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138–39 (Can.) (Canada’s Supreme Court’s 
test for when an infringement is constitutional, discussed infra). 
 60.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 21, 23. 
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The best-interest test was a balance between the minor’s growing 
autonomy61 and the State’s interest in her physical health.62 And, the Court 
concluded that “young people under 16 should be permitted to attempt to 
demonstrate that their views about a particular medical treatment decision 
reflect a sufficient degree of independence of thought and maturity.”63 As 
the minor matures, her views are to become an “increasingly determinative 
factor.”64 
This assurance, though, is little comfort to those in A.C.’s position for 
three reasons. First, the Court surveyed all cases in the U.K. and in Canada, 
and none of the cases had found a minor under 16 capable of refusing 
treatment likely to preserve her potential for a healthy future.65 Second, 
rather than undermining any of these cases, the Court suggests that the minor 
may only decide if the decision is the “right” one according to medical and 
ultimately judicial authorities.66 Third and relatedly, although minors are 
afforded greater latitude when the stakes are lower,67 when the minor’s life 
is at stake, the Court finds an opening in the “ineffability inherent in the 
concept of ‘maturity’” to undermine the minor’s autonomy interests.68 In the 
worst cases, “a careful and comprehensive evaluation of the maturity of the 
adolescent will necessarily have to be undertaken to determine whether his 
or her decision is a genuinely independent one, reflecting a real 
understanding and appreciation of the decision and its potential 
consequences.”69 Yet, presumably this same rigorous analysis must be done 
 
 61.  Whereas the Courts in Gillick and Marion focused on the minor’s “capacity” to choose, in 
Manitoba, the Court used “autonomy” interchangeably with “decisional capacity” and similar phrases. 
E.g., Gillick, [1986] 1 AC at 186 (Scarman); Marion’s Case, 175 CLR at 237; see, e.g., A.C., [2009] 2 
S.C.R. at para. 58 (“[T]he proposition advanced in [one case] was not that a “mature minor” was 
essentially an adult for medical treatment purposes, but rather that courts must give adolescents room to 
exercise their autonomy to the extent that their maturity allows.”). 
 62.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 82 (“Mature adolescents . . . have strong claims to autonomy, but 
these claims exist in tension with a protective duty on the part of the state that is also justified.”). 
 63.  Id. at para. 87. 
 64.  Id. at para. 88. 
 65.  Id. at para. 57, 59. 
 66.  See id. at para. 83–84 (quoting a Canadian practitioners manual approvingly). The minor’s 
permission only to choose beneficial care or to reject non- or low-beneficial care is sometimes called the 
“welfare principle.” Id. at para. 83. However, the Court tries to say that the divide between autonomy and 
welfare is narrow and often collapses together when one “appreciates” that respecting a truly mature 
minor’s decision is in her best interest. Id. at para. 84. These two positions are inconsistent. Either the 
overriding concern is the health of the minor or it is the ability of a demonstrably mature minor to decide 
for herself. 
 67.  Id. at para. 85. 
 68.  Id. at para. 86. 
 69.  Id. at para. 95. 
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any time a provider seeks to overrule a minor in court.70 Perhaps the Court 
presumes a provider will only pursue this option in the most serious 
situations, but stripped of all the superlative adjectives—careful, 
comprehensive, genuinely, real—the Court is back to balancing the 
autonomy against the child’s welfare, the same best-interest test with which 
the Court began before its analysis. 
It is perfectly fair and probably reasonable to believe that 14-year-olds 
are almost invariably incapable of autonomously deciding to refuse life-
saving treatment.71 But, the degree to which the Court emphasizes the 
physical health of the minor against her other possible interests, including 
her budding capacity to choose, highlights how egregiously it ignored the 
religious interest that motivated A.C. to embrace and permit her own death.72 
This is most clear in three of the Court’s failures. 
First, the Court ignores its constitution’s religious liberty provision. The 
foundation of religious liberty in Canada is section 2(a) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), a component of the Canadian 
Constitution.73 After the preamble to the Charter recognizes that Canada was 
“founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule 
of law,” the first fundamental freedom it recognizes is “of conscience and 
religion.”74 As with the rest of the Charter, this freedom is “subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society” (the limitations clause).75 In 72 words, the 
Court disposes of A.C.’s section 2(a) challenge, merely redirecting her to the 
best-interest test.76 Instead, the Court focused almost exclusively on whether 
compelling treatment violated A.C.’s Charter-based liberty interest.77 
 
 70.  CFSA § 25(8). 
 71.  See, e.g., Tara L. Kuther, Medical Decision-Making and Minors: Issues of Consent and Assent, 
38 ADOLESCENCE 343, 346–50 (2003) (reviewing psychology literature on minor’s capacity to make 
medical decisions); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 583, 583 (Oct. 2009) (considering the American Psychological Association’s seemingly 
conflicting positions on juvenile’s maturity with respect to juvenile abortion and death penalty). 
 72.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 6. 
 73.  Charter, § 2(a). The Charter is the first component of the Constitution Act of 1982. Within an 
American framework, the Act as a whole might be likened to the American Bill of Rights in that it serves 
as an alteration of the existing Constitution that addresses numerous, discrete topics. In addition to 
addressing rights and freedoms, the Act revoked the authority of the British Parliament to amend the 
Canadian Constitution at the request of the Canadian Parliament, among other things. Canada Act 1982, 
c 11, § 2 (U.K). 
 74.  Charter, § 2(a). 
 75.  Charter, § 1 (called the “limitations clause”). 
 76.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 113. 
 77.  Charter, § 7; A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 97–108. 
SIMMONS FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 3:10 PM 
2018] BEST INTEREST OF A MINOR THEIST 397 
Second, the Court ignores its standard test—the Oakes-test—for 
determining when it is constitutional to impose restrictions on the practice of 
religion.78 Throughout the majority opinion, there is only one reference to 
Oakes and that is in the brief paragraph recounting the Court of Appeal’s 
analysis.79 
In R. v. Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court analyzed the limitations 
clause and established a two-prong test for establishing when limitations on 
religious practice would be constitutional.80 First, the objective of the 
measure must “relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society.”81 Second, the measure must survive a three-part 
proportionality test:82 1) it must be “rationally connected to the objective” 
and not “arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations;” 2) it must 
impair the right or freedom “as little as possible;” and 3) its effects and the 
objective must be “proportional[].”83 While this restriction on A.C.’s 
religious practice could well be justified under this test (as the Court of 
Appeals found84), the Supreme Court does not even perform the test itself. 
Third, while considering other parts of the treaty, the court ignores two 
key articles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.85 First, while citing 
Article 14 for the subsection on the duties of parents to educate the child in 
 
 78.  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). This test is the Canadian equivalent of the American 
compelling-interest test codified by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In the U.S., the threshold 
issue is whether a government has “substantially burden[ed] a person’s exercise of religion” (substantial 
burden). Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) (2012), 
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidated only as it applies to state laws). 
Second, the government must survive a form of strict scrutiny: the measure as applied to the plaintiff 
must be 1) “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” (rationally related and compelling 
governmental interest) and 2) “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest” (least restrictive means). RFRA § 2000bb-1(b). Although the “narrowly tailored” language is 
neither a part of RFRA nor the cases on which RFRA is based, the Court has paraphrased the “least 
restrictive means” prong as “narrowly tailored.” RFRA § 2000bb(b)(1) (identifying Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) as the basis for the statute); Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 n. 30 (2014) (An amendment to the bill in question 
“would not have subjected religious-based objections to the judicial scrutiny called for by RFRA, in 
which a court must consider not only the burden of a requirement on religious adherents, but also the 
government’s interest and how narrowly tailored the requirement is.”); see also, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t 
of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (using similar 
language). 
 79.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 18. 
 80.  Charter, § 1.  
 81.  Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 138–39. 
 82.  Id. at 139. 
 83.  Id. at 139 (internal citations omitted). 
 84.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 18. 
 85.  See id. at para. 93; for previous discussion of the Convention, see supra Section A. 
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their religious practice,86 it neglects the two subsections that actually apply 
to the case at hand.87 This case was not so much an issue of what the parents 
believed as whether A.C. was old enough to believe for herself the things she 
professed.88 The Convention in general and Article 14 in particular, in 
contrast with the common law best-interests test, explicitly addresses the 
religious interests of the child.89 Referring to the child specifically, it says 
that “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.”90 This article sets two mandatory conditions for restricting the 
child’s ability to manifest her religion: that the restriction is enacted under 
Article 491 and that it is necessary for the listed purposes. Restricting 
children’s ability to refuse treatments as a manifestation of their religion does 
not fit easily within the listed purposes. While it certainly restricts the rights 
of parents to manifest their religion against the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of their child (the selfish motivation92), the only restriction of the 
minor that would fit would be one to protect the public morals or to protect 
the minor’s fundamental right to health despite her asserted right to manifest 
her religion. 
Second, when read in conjunction with article 30, restrictions on the 
minor become even more suspect. The Convention reemphasizes that States 
should protect religious (and other) minorities, that minority children “shall 
not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her 
group, . . . to profess and practise his or her own religion . . . .”93 Thus, the 
minor not only has a right to “manifest” her religion, but also to “practice” 
it. The question remains what it means for a minor to practice her religion, 
especially since the Convention recognizes only a growing capacity of a 
child to form her own view,94 but the Convention supports that it must have 
some meaning. Further, the clause is not hortatory, but mandatory: their right 
to practice religion “shall not be denied.” Finally, that Article 30 must enjoin 
signatories from denying children the right to practice their religion can only 
mean that it anticipates that children will choose to do things that are at odds 
 
 86.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 93. 
 87.  See Convention, art. 14(1), 14(3). 
 88.  A.C., [2009] 2 S.C.R. at para. 5–6. 
 89.  Convention, art. 14, 30. 
 90.  Convention, art. 14(3). 
 91.  Article 4 requires signatories to bring the treaty into force within the requirements of the 
signatory’s own legal system. 
 92.  See supra Section II. 
 93.  Convention, art. 30. 
 94.  Convention, art. 12. 
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with what the law would otherwise require of the child, with what the law 
would otherwise find rational. 
Further, when signing the Convention, Canada made a Statement of 
Understanding that expressed special concern for its aboriginal peoples and 
stated that Canada intended to give them deference under Article 30 in how 
they rear their children.95 Although JWs do not have the same historical 
relationship with the State as Canada’s aboriginal peoples, the special 
concern should apply equally to children who are minorities in other 
respects. It is therefore conspicuous that the Court does not analyze these 
sections. 
None of these critiques proves the result of the case was incorrect under 
its Constitution, the Oakes-test, or the Convention, but they highlight the 
degree to which the Court ignored A.C.’s most important, overriding 
interest, at least from the perspective of the person whose interests the Court 
was trying to protect. Thus, it becomes important to consider what type of 
relationship the State should have with the individual and with God. 
IV. THE STATE AND GOD 
A. Agnosticism Versus Atheism 
Although atheism and agnosticism are often used interchangeably, they 
are and will be treated here as distinct concepts. 
Both terms come from Greek. Because of the peculiarities of Greek 
grammar, “agnostic” means both “unknown” and “not to be known.”96 
Reflecting this dual-meaning, Merriam-Webster defines the English term 
“agnostic” as “a person who holds the view that any ultimate reality (such as 
God) is unknown and probably unknowable; broadly: one who is not 
committed to believing in either the existence or the nonexistence of God or 
a god.”97 
 
 95.  UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Convention on the Rights of Children, MTDSG Ch. 
IV, Sect. 11 available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&clang=_en (“It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in matters relating 
to aboriginal peoples of Canada, the fulfilment of its responsibilities under article 4 of the Convention 
must take into account the provisions of article 30. In particular, in assessing what measures are 
appropriate to implement the rights recognized in the Convention for aboriginal children, due regard must 
be paid to not denying their right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their own language.”). 
 96.  It is based on the prefix “α” meaning “want” (as in “privation” not “desire”) or “absence” and 
the root “γιγνώσκω” meaning “to learn to know” or “to know.” HENRY G. LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, 
AN INTERMEDIATE GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1, 7, 165 (1889) (Oxford Press reprint). 
 97.  Agnostic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agnostic 
[https://perma.cc/YT4X-QPVN] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). The Oxford English Dictionary first defines 
an “agnostic” as “[a] person who believes that nothing is known or can be known of immaterial things, 
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The Greek term, “atheism,” on the other hand, means “without God, 
denying the gods.”98 Merriam-Webster defines “atheism” as “a philosophical 
or religious position characterized by disbelief in the existence of a god or 
any gods.”99 Perhaps as a scientific matter the universe does not need God in 
order to exist.100 Even though God may be superfluous, when it is honest 
with itself, science recognizes that it cannot disprove God’s existence; God 
is beyond its competence. Or, perhaps there are persuasive philosophical 
arguments for saying positively that there is no god.101 Even though there 
may be good arguments, there are no proofs. That there is, in fact, no god is 
an article of faith.102 
In an editor’s note, Merriam-Webster clarifies that “atheist refers to 
someone who believes that there is no god (or gods), and agnostic refers to 
someone who doesn’t know whether there is a god, or even if such a thing is 
knowable.”103 This last characterization is how the terms are used here. 
Atheism is a statement of belief about the existence of God. Agnosticism is 
a statement of ignorance about the existence and nature of God. 
 
especially of the existence or nature of God. Distinguished from atheist n.” “Agnostic, n. and adj.” 
OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/4073?redirectedFrom= 
agnostic#eid (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). Second, it defines it as “[i]n extended use: a person who is not 
persuaded by or committed to a particular point of view; a sceptic.” Id. The OED thus disassociates 
skepticism from questions of belief about God, evidencing the merging of the terms atheism and 
agnosticism. Further, it makes agnosticism a much more active belief, whereas Meriam-Webster 
characterizes more as a lack of faith than a positive belief system.  
 98.  LIDDELL & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 17. It is based on the same alpha-privative and the root 
“θέος” meaning “God.” Id. at 1, 362.  
 99.  Atheism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atheism 
[https://perma.cc/9LEZ-393N] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017). The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
atheist as “[o]ne who denies or disbelieves the existence of a God.” “Atheist, n. and adj.” OXFORD ENG. 
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12450?redirectedFrom=atheist#eid (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2018). 
 100.  STEPHEN HAWKING & LEONARD MLODINOW, THE GRAND DESIGN 180 (2010) (“Spontaneous 
creation [by the force of gravity] is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe 
exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe 
going.”). 
 101.  C. M. Lorkowski, Atheism, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 523, 528–31 (2013) (presenting the most common 
philosophical arguments for atheism). 
 102.  See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961) (“The power and authority of the State of 
Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers—those who are willing to say they 
believe in ‘the existence of God.’”); Atheism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/atheism [https://perma.cc/9LEZ-393N] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017) (The 
definition above is the second definition. The first is “a lack of belief or a strong disbelief in the existence 
of a god or any gods.”). Atheism is not, though, a religion. 
 103.  Agnostic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agnostic 
[https://perma.cc/YT4X-QPVN] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).  
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Consistent with these distinctions, a State can take three general 
approaches to religion.104 It can 1) endorse or favor one religion (theist), 2) 
reject all religion and enforce a strictly secular state (atheist),105 or 3) it can 
permit or encourage religious pluralism (agnostic). 106 In the first two, the 
State makes a particular decision about the existence and nature of God. In 
the last, it claims ignorance. Although the difference between the second and 
the third approaches may often escape notice, the two are quite distinct. They 
explain why some police wear turbans107 and why some teachers may not 
wear crucifixes.108 It is perfectly reasonable and legitimate for a people to 
believe that there is no god and so found a State on that belief. But it is 
likewise legitimate, if not also reasonable, for a people to believe there is a 
god and to found a State on that belief. 
B. Canada and the United States are Agnostic, Not Atheistic 
Nevertheless, neither Canada nor the United States are so situated. Not 
only has Canada declared God supreme,109 but it has also encouraged 
religious pluralism and religious expression from public officers.110 Whereas 
the United States Constitution permits “neutral law[s] of general 
applicability” to override religious concerns,111 Canada places the onus on 
 
 104.  Another commentator divided the approaches the State can take into four categories based on 
the possible answers to two questions: whether religious truth exists and whether the State should enforce 
that belief. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: a Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
1159, 1164 (2013). Thus, there would be: 1) a theist state like Saudi Arabia, enforcing its religious truth 
on its citizens; 2) a secular state like Israel declaring a religious truth while tolerating the religious practice 
of others; 3) a secular state like most liberal democracies that makes no religious declaration and usually 
tolerates idiosyncratic religious practices; and 4) an atheist state that does not tolerate variance from social 
and legal norms. 
 105.  1958 CONST. prmbl. art. 1 (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social 
Republic.”). 
 106.  See generally Bruce Ryder, The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship, in LAW 
AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 87, 157 (Richard Moon ed., 2008) (discussing Canada’s 
emphasis on religious pluralism). 
 107.  Grant v. Canada, [1995] 1 F.C. 158, 213. 
 108.  Elaine Sciolino, French Assembly Votes to Ban Religious Symbols in Schools, NY TIMES (Feb. 
11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/world/french-assembly-votes-to-ban-religious-symbols-
in-schools.html. 
 109.  Charter, preamble. Although Canada does declare that God exists and so should technically be 
considered theistic, it in no way imposes that belief. For example, atheists are welcome to participate in 
government and receive benefits. The point here is that Canada is neither atheistic nor theocractic.  
 110.  Ryder, supra note 106, at 88. For an historical survey of the development of religious liberty in 
Canada, see Beverley McLachlin, Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: a Canadian Perspective, in 
RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
17–21 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004) (Author is the Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court.). 
 111.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
SIMMONS FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 3:10 PM 
402 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 28:385 
the government112 to justify burdens on religious expression, even for neutral 
rules.113 When Canada changed its Royal Canadian Mounted Police uniform 
policy to permit Sikhs to wear their religiously mandated turbans, a change 
with an explicit religious purpose, the change was constitutionally 
permitted.114 
The United States has not been as explicit as Canada about recognizing 
and encouraging the centrality of religion and more directly, the primacy of 
God, in public life, but its history has been quite clear. While the Founders 
explicitly rejected religious tests in the Constitution,115 many States’ versions 
of the no-religious-test clause explicitly permitted the exclusion of atheists 
from public office.116 
The First Congress in the Bill of Rights named freedom of religion their 
primary concern, above freedoms of speech and assembly, freedom from 
 
 112.  In R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., the Court considered an exception to a law that required 
business to be closed on Sundays that was narrower than Saturday-observers thought constitutional. 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 724–25 (Can.). While it found against the Saturday-observers, the Court still held 
that even laws with secular purposes that were “inoffensive” to the Charter rights of conscience and 
religion required the Court to consider whether they were offensive in effect. Id. at 752; see R. v. Big M 
Drug Mart, Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 347 (Can.) (While the Court struck down the Sunday-closing law 
in question, in dicta, it said, “[t]he equality necessary to support religious freedom does not require 
identical treatment of all religions. In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation 
in treatment.”). 
  Likewise and consistent with the American Supreme Court, the Canadian Court also requires 
employers “to make a reasonable effort to accommodate the religious needs of the employee, short of 
undue hardship . . . .” Ontario Human Rights Comm’n v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 553 
(Can.) (referencing American Supreme Court cases for this formulation). In Simpsons-Sears, the Court 
found that an employer must accommodate a Seventh-Day Adventist’s Saturday-Sabbath observance 
even though Saturday was the busiest day of the week and the employer required all employees to work 
two of every three Saturdays for a non-discriminatory reason. Id. at 539–40.  
 113.  Though the U.S. does this by statute, as discussed supra note 78. 
 114.  Grant v. Canada, [1995] 1 F.C. 158, 213. 
 115.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 116.  See Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1649, 
1669 (2007) (“Oaths were taken seriously at the Founding, and an individual who bound himself through 
an oath was considered solemnly bound to keep his word and to fulfill exactly the promise he had uttered. 
Anything less would breach the covenant that the individual had formed with God and with the state when 
he took the oath.”).  
  Many State constitutional provisions remain on the books, despite their invalidation by Torcaso 
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 1 (“No person who denies the being 
of a God shall hold any office in the civil departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a 
witness in any Court.”); MD. CONST. art. 37 (“That no religious test ought ever to be required as a 
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence 
of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this 
Constitution.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any 
office, or public trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from holding office on account of his 
religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being.”). 
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unwarranted search and seizure and the right to a jury, and all others.117 In 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the same Congress required—and still requires—
all U.S. judges to pray for the help of God in completing their duties.118 It 
established and funded a chaplaincy, still in place today, for the House and 
Senate.119 It asked President Washington to proclaim a day of thanksgiving 
for the “favours of Almighty God.”120 
While the Supreme Court has rejected attempts by various levels of 
government to participate directly in religious expression,121 it has upheld 
the chaplaincy and legislative prayer,122 and has expressed disinterest in 
declaring unconstitutional numerous governmental recognitions of the 
supremacy of God over American affairs: on its money, in its pledge,123 at 
the start of court sessions,124 and in its officer’s oaths.125 
And even though it might be hard to think of American voters electing 
a niqab-wearing woman,126 it is unthinkable that once elected she would be 
 
 117.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012) (unanimously finding that the First Amendment “gives 
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations” not enjoyed by secular groups); see Emp’t Div., 
Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
text of the First Amendment itself ‘singles out’ religion for special protections.” (internal citations 
omitted)); see Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (“[O]nly beliefs rooted in 
religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Purely secular views do not suffice.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 
72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1597, 1598 (1997) (“The Free Exercise Clause only makes sense on the 
assumption that God exists; that God makes claims on the loyalty of human beings; and that these claims 
are prior to and superior in obligation to the claims of the State.”); see generally, Dmitry N. Feofanov, 
Defining Religion: an Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (1994) (arguing why religion should 
be treated differently than secular ethical systems); id. at 327 n. 93 (“[R]eligion is singled out for special 
treatment.”). 
 118.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76; 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (“I, __ __, do solemnly 
swear . . . . So help me God.”). 
 119.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). 
 120.  McCreary Cty. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 886 (forbidding a 10 Commandments display at a courthouse); Cty. of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (forbidding a 
crèche display on government property at Christmas); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) 
(forbidding public school prayer). 
 122.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 123.  Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (in dicta, calling references to God on money and in the 
pledge “ceremonial deism” and therefore, unconcerning); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 4-5 (2004) (dismissing challenge to “under God” in Pledge of Allegiance on standing grounds). 
 124.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786 (suggesting in dicta that “God save the United States and this Honorable 
Court” does not pose an Establishment Clause problem). 
 125.  Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1001 (2011). 
 126.  See Justin McCarthy, In U.S., Socialist Presidential Candidates Least Appealing, GALLUP 
NEWS (Jun. 22, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/183713/socialist-presidential-candidates-least-
appealing.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CDN-N4TC] (reporting a poll that found that all other things being 
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barred from wearing her niqab in office.127 “We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”128 Even if it is too much to say 
the United States was founded as a Christian nation or on Judeo-Christian 
values, it is far too much to say the inverse: that it was founded as an atheist 
nation.129 
Neither Canada nor the U.S. endorse any particular form of 
worshipping God, and, in fact, eschew such endorsement. Yet, neither 
country embraces atheism; rather, both celebrate, honor, and protect their 
citizens’ independent and diverse worship of God. Thus, the Canadian and 
American constitutions and governments are, and ought to be, considered 
agnostic, rather than atheistic.130 
C. Agnosticism and the State’s Relationship with God 
If there is any afterlife, this life fills an infinitesimally smaller period of 
time than the one to follow. An atheistic state should disregard this 
possibility because it has already judged it impossible. An agnostic state, 
though, cannot disregard this possibility, because it recognizes its own 
ignorance on the matter. In such a state, then, the eternal status of the soul 
must enter the conversation about the propriety of any governmental 
coercion. Whether what follows this life is nonexistence, bliss, or an 
existence wherever one is judged to go, that status will last much longer than 
 
equal, only 60% of Americans would vote for a Muslim; only 58% and 47% would vote for an atheist or 
a socialist respectively). 
 127.  See Angelique Chrisafis, Full-Face Veils Outlawed as France Spells Out Controversial Niqab 
Ban, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/03/niqab-ban-france-
muslim-veil [https://perma.cc/JLW5-HES3]. 
 128.  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see generally Paulsen, 
supra note 117 at 1598 (taking it one step further and arguing that we are also “a people whose 
Constitution presupposes a Supreme Being”). 
 129.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (The First “Amendment 
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it 
does not require the state to be their adversary.”) 
  Justice Breyer, the swing vote in the two 2005 10 Commandments cases, found for himself that 
the Constitution only demands “noninterference and noninvolvement,” not “a brooding and pervasive 
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.” Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see McCreary Cty. v. American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 848 (2005). Four justices were happy to go much further and say that the 
government can favor religion over irreligion. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 684, 684 n. 3 (plurality) (citing 
four other Supreme Court opinions); but see McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 875 (plurality including Breyer, 
J.) (saying the direct opposite with O’Connor, J., being the only Justice not to join either opinion); see 
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415–16 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring alone) (The First 
Amendment “affirmatively requires government to create an atmosphere of hospitality and 
accommodation to individual belief or disbelief.”). 
 130.  For an in-depth argument that the American Constitution is agnostic and is not atheistic, see 
generally Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U.L. REV. 120 (2008). 
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this present status. When considering the best-interest of its citizens, law and 
policy should take note.131 
There are four distinct ways in which God (or gods132) and an afterlife133 
may exist or not exist. First, God may not exist. Second, God may exist, but 
pass no judgment on the actions of people, giving them eternal bliss (or not) 
regardless of how they lived their lives. Third, God may exist and judges 
people without reference to their moral culpability (an amoral god).134 
Fourth, God may exist and judge actions based on a person’s moral 
culpability for evil choices freely made (a moral god). 
With respect to how a State should act, though, the four ways can be 
reduced to three. First are the instances where this life has no bearing on the 
afterlife. If there is no god or afterlife—the standard atheist position—then 
all of a person’s actions cease to matter as to her at her death. Atheists may 
contrive great moral systems to obtain for the most number of people food, 
drink, and merriment, but tomorrow they die, and none of it matters to them 
anymore whatsoever. All life ends in final death. Paradoxically likewise, if 
there is an afterlife consisting of a common place of bliss, torment, or mere 
shadowy subsistence, with no regard for how a person lived her earthly life, 
neither then does this life have any bearing on the person’s eternal state. 
Further, if there is no such thing as choice and all things we call choice are 
merely chemical responses determined by external stimuli, then any afterlife 
cannot be based on moral judgment anyway. Similarly, if human life is 
subject to random reincarnation, the analysis is the same as the common 
afterlife. Therefore, in either system, whatever policy a State pursues with 
regard to any person is inconsequential because life itself is meaningless with 
respect to a person’s eternal state, be it annihilation or a common afterlife 
for all. 
Second, if God differs a person’s eternal state based on characteristics 
or events involuntary to the person, then a State’s actions can directly and 
adversely affect that person’s eternal state. If God forbids transfusion on pain 
 
 131.  Ruth Macklin writes widely on topics of conscience, bioethics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
particular. However, she and many others find the value of natural life and the value of patient autonomy 
to create a “moral dilemma [that] has no clear solution.” Ruth Macklin, Consent, Coercion, and Conflicts 
of Rights, 20 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 360, 363 (1977). This is because she and others disregard the 
issue of eternity, against which irrelevant considerations shrink in the distance. 
 132.  Admittedly, the following language is most consonant with monotheistic religions with which 
I anticipate most readers are most familiar, but it is equally applicable to polytheistic religions or religions 
that include reincarnation based (or not) on moral culpability during life. 
 133.  Without an afterlife, State coercion or even action makes little ultimate difference as discussed 
below. 
 134.  The latter possibility is typical of Calvinism and is called (double) predestination. In legal 
terms, it might be likened to strict scrutiny. Baptists and Presbyterians are notable modern off-shoots of 
Calvinism, though many in those denominations no longer believe in predestination. 
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of damnation and the State forces it, even against the child’s will, the child 
is damned. 
Third, if God judges people based on their moral culpability or merit,135 
State action is divided into two classes: compulsion and coercion. 
Compulsion is forcing an individual to do (or submit) to something, whereas 
coercion is incenting an individual to do something, usually in a manner the 
one using the term believes is too much. 
For example, the JW-blood-transfusion cases are most easily 
understood as involving State compulsion. The State does not care whether 
the minor (or her parents) submit to the transfusion; it is willing to use all 
force necessary—including sedation for the minor and temporary restraint 
for the parents—to ensure the minor is transfused. An involuntary, but 
compelled transfusion is not morally culpable. 
A coerced transfusion, where the minor (or parents) have a true choice 
whether or not to submit, is morally culpable. That said, coercion can 
encourage—though not cause—a person to sin. State coercion, thus, only 
indirectly affects the person’s eternal state. The threat of compulsion itself is 
coercive, but in the face of overwhelming force, peaceful resignation is not 
typically considered culpable. 
V. EFFECT OF AGNOSTICISM ON MINORS 
A State’s interest in a minor is derivative of the minor’s interest in 
herself. Thus, insofar as the State has not rejected the possibility of the 
existence of God, the minor’s spiritual claims about God’s commands should 
go to the heart of the analysis of her best interest. 
That analysis has five possible results. 1) Minors who have been found 
to be mature with respect to their particular treatment are to be treated like 
adults and to be allowed to reject their treatment on whatever basis.136 They 
are adults for medical decision-making purposes; this is simply what legal 
maturity means. 
The remaining four results are divided based on whether the minor can 
articulate a clear religious position (even though legally immature) and 
whether that position concerns a moral god or an amoral god: 2) minors who 
believe in a moral god, 3) surrogates who assert the religious interests of the 
child with respect to a moral god, 4) minors who believe in an amoral god, 
and 5) surrogates who assert the religious interests of the child with respect 
to an amoral god. 
 
 135.  Included here are most groups who speak of God as judge, including Catholics and many other 
Christian denominations. E.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 678–79 (2d. 1997). 
 136.  E.g., A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, para. 46 (Can.). 
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A. Minors and Surrogates, and a Moral God 
If the minor believes in a moral god or her parents assert such an 
interest, then, by that religious position’s own terms, State compulsion does 
not matter as to her spiritual state. The harm here is compulsion, not 
damnation. The harm is against the minor’s (religious) self-fulfillment, not 
directly against her soul. Compulsion is an external, involuntary force, so it 
can have no bearing on an individual who will be judged solely on voluntary 
acts. To avoid moral culpability, a minor should vehemently resist treatment, 
as should her parents. Then the State should do whatever it finds consonant 
with the minor’s interest in physical health and autonomy. The minor and 
the parents have fulfilled their moral obligation by exerting their will against 
the violation of God’s command and the State has fulfilled its obligation to 
ensure that the minor remains healthy and truly has capacity when she makes 
such a consequential decision. The minor’s right to practice a religion is 
protected by the autonomy prong of the best-interest test in which the court 
determines if the minor is even capable of making a choice. If she can, then 
she is mature and can decide as she pleases. If she cannot, the State decides 
for her. Thus, with respect to compulsion, the State need show no more 
restraint than if it were atheist. This is not to say that the State might not have 
other reasons for restraint—such as respect for the minor’s interest in 
autonomy—but only that it should be no different than if it were atheist. 
Further, in no meaningful respect can State compulsion—especially in 
the context of a forced transfusion—be characterized as coercion. The minor 
and parents have no opportunity to make a morally culpable choice. In most 
other contexts that require the unwilling to participate, State coercion can 
have spiritual ramifications that requires the special concern of a court.137 
But, this is one of the few contacts that the State has with religious practice 
that has little, if any spiritual significance because there is no choice. 
Thus, the Court only needs to establish that the minor (or her parents, 
as appropriate) believe in a moral god and then simply balance the minor’s 
interest in her physical health and her interest in autonomy. In the face of a 
clear physical need, all the weight then gets put on the analysis of her 
autonomy interest. God need not be placed on the scales at all. 
 
 137.  This is so because the State would be encouraging the individual to sin. For example, when the 
State threatens a pro-life gynecologist with termination at the state-hospital if she does not perform an 
abortion. Whereas coercing someone to violate a deeply held secular ethic is abhorrent in its own right, 
coercing someone to violate her religious tenant is even worse because it is driving her to perdition, that 
is, an afterlife that is eminently possible according to an agnostic State. To be clear, with respect to a 
moral god, when coercing, the State does not cause the person to violate her ethic or sin, but facilitates 
and encourages the person to do so. 
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B. Minors and an Amoral God 
In this category fall legally immature minors who can, nevertheless, 
fully articulate a well-considered religious position in a way that satisfies the 
court that it is not mere parroting. Minors that fall below this threshold are 
considered in the following section. 
Whereas the minor’s interests in her own autonomy and in her physical 
health sufficed to answer how the State should act for the minor who claimed 
a moral god, here, it no longer suffices. Because the minor is claiming that 
the State can inflict direct harm on her soul, if not destroy it, the minor’s 
immortal spiritual state should be a third, independent and overriding factor 
in the best-interest analysis. 
The State must decide how the minor’s clear interests in her physical 
health and in having capacity to make a life-or-death decision before making 
it weigh against her asserted interest in her immortal soul. In an agnostic 
State, the State does not know if God demands that people not take blood 
products or what the penalty would be to the individual for blood products 
being forced on her. To be consistent with its agnosticism, the State should, 
therefore, defer to the immature minor on the spiritual claim and permit her 
to allow herself to die; the State should allow the 8-year-old JW to die. 
If instead the State compels lifesaving treatment on a minor, the State 
effectively says one of two things, both of which are religious claims. First, 
the State could be saying that no god would make such a demand; no god 
would hold an immature minor culpable for what was forced on her against 
her will. Such a claim would be consistent with the claims about God of most 
of the world’s theists, who believe in a moral god. But, it is still a religious 
claim. Second, the State could claim that the soul’s (immortal) status after 
death is of less concern or value than the value of renewed physical health 
and the additional opportunity to experience physical life (however 
fleeting).138 
Although it may seem tempting, it cannot be that the State is only saying 
that the odds that the universe is governed by the minor’s amoral god is 
sufficiently small relative to the odds that it is either governed by a moral 
god or by no god at all, that the State is willing to risk the immature minor’s 
eternal state in order to preserve for the minor her health and opportunity to 
attain maturity. This is merely a restatement of the second claim and does 
not escape that the State is making a religious claim. 
 
 138.  See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 11, verse 488–91 (Richmond Lattimore trans., HarperCollins 
2007) (Achilles, hero of the Greeks at Troy now dead in Hades, described his perspective on the afterlife 
to Odysseus: “. . . never try to console me for dying. / I would rather follow the plow as thrall to another 
/ man, one with no land allotted him and not much to live on, / than be a king over all the perished  
dead. . . .).  
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Because of the possibilities of medicine and the occurrence of these 
religious claims, the State must do one of two seemingly unconscionable 
things. It must either allow an 8-year-old to die from an eminently curable 
ailment or adopt a statement of faith about the nature of God. 
Common law countries seem to have already drawn a line for these 
cases. Children can refuse treatment as long as the treatment would not 
almost assuredly be lifesaving. If the religious refusal probably will not 
majorly affect the life of the minor, she may do so.139 If the minor probably 
will die even with the treatment, she may refuse it.140 When the only thing 
standing between death and a healthy physical life is the minor’s refusal, the 
State will force treatment.141 This is a reasonable place to draw the line, but 
it is founded on a religious assumption.142 In the first two situations, the 
balancing of the minor’s religious interest weighs in favor of deference: her 
interest in physical health weighs against deference, and her autonomy 
interest weighs either way, but it all results in deference. In the final situation, 
the minor’s religious interest is insufficient to overcome her other interests. 
The State is free to adopt this nuanced religious position, just as much 
as it is free to reject the existence of God altogether or adopt a doctrine about 
his nature. But, especially in an agnostic State, it should do so plainly. It 
should openly state that although otherwise agnostic, the State does not 
believe that God, if he exists, is amoral, or that physical life is more 
important than any possible life after. 
C. Surrogates and an Amoral God 
In this final category fall those minors incapable of expressing belief 
for themselves. Some readers may not be convinced that there are minors 
 
 139.  E.g., Gillick v. West Norfolk [1985] UKHL 7, [1986] 1 AC 112 (HL) 169 (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (Fraser). 
 140.  E.g., A.C. v. Manitoba, [2009] S.C.R. at para. 62–63 (citing two lower Canadian court opinions 
that refused to allow the State to take custody of children refusing treatment when the odds the treatment 
would restore the children to health was low). 
 141.  E.g., id. at para. 57, 59. 
 142.  The American Supreme Court drew a line between religious opposition to all war and religious 
opposition to only some wars because it would be too difficult to sort out cowardly draft dodgers from 
those with sincere religious conviction. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454–460 (1971). 
Similarly, the Court drew a line between Government use of the Social Security number of a child and 
her father’s concern that the Government’s using the number would harm her child’s spirit. Bowen v. 
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695, 698 (1986). The Court decided both on practical, worldly considerations. This 
Note in no way attempts to say this is wrong because it is a different issue for a different Note. Gillette 
and Bowen are distinguishable because the Court is not directly considering the best interest of the 
petitioners so a religious assumption was not required. When looking at the best interest of the child, her 
true best interest includes her afterlife which she believes she can expect and the State cannot deny. 
Deciding against her requires a religious assumption whereas deciding against the conscientious objectors 
and the father does not. 
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that fall in the previous section, in which case all legally immature minors 
would fall here. 
Because this category couples uncommon and unpopular religious 
positions with surrogacy, it is particularly contentious. In a child-labor case, 
the American Supreme Court was quite clear: “Parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves.”143 
Yet, both Canada and the U.S. permit parents to make religious 
decisions for their child, even ones that harm them. Namely, parents may 
have their son circumcised.144 Although this is a narrow exception to the 
general prohibition that parents not permit their children be harmed, it is an 
example of parents receiving deference to harm or risk harming their 
children for religious, or even secular, reasons.145 
As disposed of earlier, there is no justification for permitting parents 
who believe in a moral god from refusing on religious grounds healthful 
treatments accepted by broader society. The State certainly has the power to 
intervene and exercises it quite visibly in cases of child abuse or neglect. 
However, in most cases where the State takes custody of the child, it is 
readily apparent that the parents are failing their obligation to secure the 
welfare of the minor. In those cases, the minor is being physically harmed 
out of no other interest for the minor. 
An agnostic State, by definition, does not know whether parents, when 
they refuse treatments because of the commands of an amoral god, are 
permitting physical harm for the sake of a countervailing, superior interest 
of the minor. Parents are always allowed to and, in fact, are required to 
authorize a physician to set a minor’s broken bone or to perform surgery to 
remove a malignant tumor. Parents permit one physical harm out of the 
minor’s broader interest in physical health. Likewise, parents permit the risk 
that minors be injured in sports in part for the sake of their leadership and 
team-orientation development (quasi-autonomy interests). 
 
 143.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (finding that children may not sell religious 
pamphlets on street corners, even when accompanied by a parent); id. at 166–67 (“The right to practice 
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.”). 
 144.  See generally, Adam Cohen, San Francisco’s Circumcision Ban: An Attack on Religious 
Freedom?, TIME (June 13, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077240,00.html 
(presenting an overview of an attempt to ban male circumcision, even circumcisions for religious 
reasons).  
 145.  Neither country proscribes piercing infant’s ears, even though the infant does not assent, 
piercing has no health benefit, and it risks harming the infant even beyond the immediate pain. 
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Both the State’s and parents’ interest in minors are derivative of the 
minor’s own rights. The State is a surrogate as much as the parents. If the 
State is agnostic, then, as far as the State is concerned, the parents’ evaluation 
of the minor’s interest is quite possibly correct. 
For many, the idea that God could demand that a child be allowed to 
die rather than transfused is so foreign that it must be wrong and there cannot 
be a justification for it.146 Yet, the whole point of the inquiry is the best 
interest of the child, so if one accepts that it is a possible divine command, 
as well as the spiritual agnosticism of the State, then letting sincere religious 
belief decide the issue is not such an outlandish proposition.  
If it remains unconscionable that a minor be allowed to die, then the 
State should say so, but it should say so plainly. It should not hide this 
religious position on the nature of God and the soul in a discussion about the 
minor’s interest in self-expression. With a moral god, establishing the extent 
of the minor’s decision-making capacity suffices. With an amoral god, it 
does not suffice and the question of the nature of God should not be ignored 
as if it did. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note does not propose to answer whether the State should take the 
religious position or not. Rather, it has tried to encourage courts applying the 
best-interest test to consider a minor’s religious interest seriously. Doing so 
may not often lead to a result different than a simple test for decision-making 
capacity. Nevertheless, a State that says in its constitution that it takes 
religious liberty seriously, should do so in practice. It must speak plainly 
when it favors one religious position over another. Ignoring a minor’s 
religious interest when investigating her best interest is insufficient. 
 
 
 146.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) 
(“Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, religious beliefs need not be 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection.” (internal citations omitted)). 
